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An attempt is made to specify the structure of the hominin bands that began steps to
language. Storytelling could evolve without need for language yet be strongly subject
to natural selection and could provide a major feedback process in evolving language. A
storytelling model is examined, including its effects on the evolution of consciousness
and the possible timing of language evolution. Behavior planning is presented as a model
of language evolution from storytelling. The behavior programming mechanism in both
directions provide a model of creating and understanding behavior and language. Culture
began with societies, then family evolution, family life in troops, but storytelling created a
culture of experiences, a ﬁnal step in the long process of achieving experienced adults by
natural selection. Most language evolution occurred in conversations where evolving non-
verbal feedback ensured mutual agreements on understanding. Natural language evolved
in conversations with feedback providing understanding of changes.
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BACKGROUND
In 1990, Behavioral andBrain Sciences publishedperhaps themost
comprehensive examination of the evolution of natural languages.
Professors Pinker and Bloom (1990) led the discussion. The dis-
cussion stimulated further contributions to the topic. Corballis
(2003) presented an excellent history of accounts of a gestural ori-
gin of language as well as strong arguments for such an origin. In
2009, he presented a summary of the progress since the 1990 dis-
cussion. Tomasello (2010) presented a different account of gestural
origins that included a new form of gesture, pantomimes, which
extend the semantic content of gestures, within the capabilities of
a hominin but beyond those of apes. His other advance, developed
strongly in (2014) was the case for shared mutual understanding
and intentionality, a common ground in interactions which he
shows as essential even for pointing gestures in hominins. Cor-
ballis (2003) and Tomasello (2010) made clear that the calls of
primates are ﬁxed and unlikely to contribute to the origins of
human language, so that a gestural origin is more likely. Neither
writer showed why gestures might lead to increasing numbers of
descendants, emphasized as essential in 1990. It is as though the
reproductive advantages of a gestural language from the beginning
are obvious.
The need for Tomasello’s (2010) common ground in interac-
tions is clear, but it is difﬁcult to see two adult primates who have
had a long social relationship involving many interactions, com-
ing together, alerting as one enters what Hediger (1962) called the
personal space of the other, without both already knowing what
will happen next and the probable outcome of the interaction,
a shared understanding and intentionality, a common ground.
Social relationships in many gregarious species would build such
common grounds. Creating common grounds is probably part of
all mammalian and avian social relationships, perhaps often only
“simple”mainly agonistic ones. Forming shared common ground,
limited or general, positive or negative, is central to forming
relationships.
HOMININ SOCIETIES
Understanding the hominin societies in which the ﬁrst steps to
language occurred is important. We assume the hominins were
bipedal. We also know that somewhere on the hominin pathway
the primate troops changed frommulti-male,multi-female troops
to bands of pair families. Reasons for the transitions can only
be speculative but the two transitions were relevant to language
evolution. I suggest they were related.
Becoming bipedal must have been a very stressful period in
evolution. Short periods of bipedal walking were always an option
for terrestrial primates. More important is why in one band, indi-
viduals found it essential to remain erect for long periods, setting
conditions for natural selection to begin the transition to bipedal-
ism. McBride (2000) suggested that the ﬁrst step was the ability
of young males to defeat older males for rank with sharp sticks.
Animals winning high rank with sticks could not readily discard
them. Retaining sticks soon gave other uses for them; they could
also be used by both genders for digging while foraging.
Wheeler (1988, 1991) suggested that bipedalism and loss of hair
arose to reduce the heat load on apes moving into open unshaded
country. Erect females would always be initially handicapped by
this posture but lack of shade has not brought any other mammal
to lose hair. The individuals had to decide whether the heat load
justiﬁed the standing erect with the huge pain load involved in
standing/walking for long periods.
We can only speculate on why these changes occurred. Yet it
could only have been an intragroup demand that pressed on indi-
viduals all and every day; the transition was painful. We know
that already in Ardipithecus (White et al., 2009), perhaps the ear-
liest erect hominin, the great canines, ﬁerce threats/weapons for
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millions of years were already reduced with minimum sex dimor-
phism. A replacement weapon would have made them irrelevant
almost immediately.
The role of weapons in the transition becomes relevant because
of the competitiveness of the chimpanzee type troops as an ances-
tral hominin model, (Tomasello, 2010, 2014). Armed hominins
had to become more cooperative, cautious with weapons that
could easily wound each other especially with/by youngsters.
Standing erect for long periods must have been painful. Young-
sters could manage better than adults. All would have needed to
rest, leaning on their sticks and often ﬁnding opportunities to sit.
Often adults would have reverted to quadruped walking, dragging
sticks along the ground.
Males had always walked erect occasionally, taking turns in
long grass to avoid blundering into hidden predators. For the
females, the bipedal step was more stressful. They were always
pregnant or carrying offspring, perfectly adapted to an ancient
horizontal spine. A vertical spine changed the suspension of every
internal organ, changed the demands of heavy pregnancy and
carrying infants, while revising the whole behavior of infant car-
rying and nursing; adult females were obviously last to achieve full
bipedalism. They needed help.
Both bonobo and our ancestor females made the change to
“anytime sex.” It was as though they came into their ﬁrst estrus
with an interest in sex and lost the ability to turn off the estrus after
ovulation. In bonobos, the change in society gave control of access
to sex into the hands of the females and it has remained there;
they needed no help. Powerful males no longer controlled mating.
In the human ancestral line, I suggest anytime sex arrived while
changing to bipedalism. The formation of consort pairs, common
in chimpanzees,was thenwelcome,with dominantmales prepared
to protect and support sexually active females, even to sharing
food. The support was not every three or four years during estrus
but daily throughout life; the price was anytime sex, now privately
as in chimpanzee consort pairs. As anytime sex females reached
maturity, they would immediately be taken by males powerful
enough to protect them. Some young females reaching maturity
may have still moved between troops seeking consort males. With
daily sex, advertising ovulation became irrelevant and disruptive
to pairs seeking separation. Ovulation became and remains essen-
tially silent. The vulva became less conspicuous when standing
erect and selection completed the elimination of what was now
a disruptive estrus display. Males remained in control of females
and mating in consort pairs.
Diamond (1991, pp. 67) listed six models for the evolution of
silent ovulation; none involved the established consort pair model
already well known in chimpanzees.
Hrdy (2009) suggests that the extra help erect and presumably
unbonded females have always needed with offspring came from
many sources, from mating with several males, all of whom might
feel prepared to help, or from close kin, older offspring, grand-
parents, or siblings. Kin may well be involved, but we know the
transition to mainly pair matings occurred. She did not consider
consort pairs models beginning with males helping and defend-
ing sexually available females, separately within troops. Pairs do
not mean absence of other females helping. Models can only be
speculative.
We know in time, troops changed, probably from the typical
chimpanzee structure to an erect pair family societal structure
in bands of hominins. The troops would remain foragers and
scavengers. They could no longer run competently, but could face
predators with a wall of sharp sticks, probably eventually learning
to scavenge, driving predators from their prey.
Presumably troops remained territorial; all descendants have
retained suspicion/hostility toward neighboring bands. Pairs were
the key to preparing these hominins for better communication.
Pairs were always together, cooperating, foraging, and sharingwith
their young and each other. They rested and nested together. Other
pair families were always nearby; neighboring females were prob-
ably friendly, groomed each other and were sometimes relatives.
There had always been social relationships inmammals,well devel-
oped in primates. The constant need for cooperation within the
pair family ensured that communication was developing in 100s
of small ways, by gesture, sounds, and facial expression. Tomasello
(2010) showed how a touch on mother’s back became a signal
for mother to stop, crouch for the offspring to climb onto her
back. Living closely together fosters such communicative develop-
ments. Families nearby understood each other’s communications;
they became a culture of the troop (Tomasello, 2010), carried
between troops by young females seeking mates. Gestures are part
of the lives of apes and people, especially producing common
communicative ground within pair families. Except for selection
for facility in their use, no obvious reason is suggested for why or
how these isolated gestures might have become subject to natural
selection capable of creating language.
Yet the range of gestures needed was large in such close working
relationships, perhaps 100s of gestures of hands, head, and arms as
well as vocal and facial expressions would have become necessary.
It is not hard to think of a long list: come, go, pick up, hide, run,
quiet, look, listen, pull (root plants), carry, drink, water, infant
come back, carry, I’ll carry, sit, cut, eat, suck, watch out, stop, keep
back, give, no, yes. Perhaps they invented names for infants to
call them and probably names for the animals, fruits, and vegeta-
bles they ate. Youngsters from different families probably joined
together daily for play. Only seeing their full range of contexts and
activities could we see the full range of communication they would
need daily. Hominins needed all of these signals and many more
to cooperate and help each other in close bonds, with perhaps a
mobile youngster and an infant. Gestures seldom fell into logical
sequences that needed grammar or syntax. The 100 emotions gen-
erated daily would already be expressed but perhaps modiﬁed in
such close relationships.
Foraging together brought essential cooperation. Presumably
this may have led to more support by males when increasing
neonate head size led to the birth of altricial helpless infants when
mothers again needed more help.
Tomasello (2014) saw the development of common ground
and intentionality in social relationships as a ﬁrst step toward
what he describes as the common ground of groups. He makes no
suggestions about which social relationships were involved. Few
relationships would involve the demands for cooperation, inte-
gration, and common ground as would the relationships in pair
families living separately within troops. The list above indicates
some of the endless communication that had to go on within
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cooperating families. This is why an understanding of the societal
structure of hominin troops becomes important.
For language to begin, separations were needed before new
stories could be brought home. The separation could be ﬁssion–
fusion or could be after hominins acquired a rotating clavicle
allowing development of throwing skills (Gore, 2003) to be able
to hunt; this allowed males to leave the foraging females, return-
ing to camps in the afternoon after hunting. Separating males
for hunting denied boy children knowledge of hunting models
for play. Returning sub-groups of males and females had stories.
Returning females would mimic the unusual behaviors observed
while foraging. One mime might describe a female chasing and
repeatedly beating a small mammal to death after missing with
a single effective blow; females and males were amused. Perhaps
it was a clumsy act by one female or the disorganized panic of
discovering an infant had strayed that would be mimicked for
amusement. This was sharing gossip, something all had enjoyed
watching within troops for eons.
It is important to recognize this central activity of watching
stories endlessly unfolding within primate troops. Daily everyone
could watch a pestering youngster being weaned, youngsters play-
ing “king of the castle,” a female approaching her male or even
another female to groom. There are tiffs and reconciliations and
sometimes ﬁghts. Tracking the behavior of others to understand
its goal or meaning is quite general in many animals. Without it
there could be no social facilitation and little socialization. How
does tracking occur?
TRACKING TO UNDERSTAND BEHAVIOR
Each moment of behavior is watched. The image of each move-
ment was sensed, recognized with its function and probable
interpretation, normally by comparison with an equivalent famil-
iar relevant image in memory; how else could a movement or
anything observed be recognized; (unless perhaps by a mirror
neuron, Rizzolatti et al., 1996)? Mirror neurons have produced
important behavior models and much controversy, e.g., Hickok
(2013). Sensory input produces only images, visual, olfactory, or
auditory. The movement images are thus sequenced and remem-
bered/processed one by one until the goal of the behavior or
interaction is understood. Goals are central to the creation and
tracking of behavior. Frith (2007) wrote “To imitate someone, we
watch their movements closely, but we don’t copy these move-
ments. We use the movements to discover something in the mind
of the person we are watching: the goal of their movement.”
(Kindle Location 2275–2276). Modern children are well able to
differentiate goals of behavior from the behavior itself, Bekkering
et al. (2000). These studies were on people, but animal minds too
seem to be designed for tracking behavior and determining its
goals (Frith and Frith, 2012).
The goals of common behaviors would be quickly anticipated.
Behaviors repeated as in social facilitation are familiar and easily
anticipated. I suggest this tracking is little different fromme listen-
ing to your words, referring the images of each word to memory
for its recognition and identiﬁcation, goals of images of phrases
and sentences are held in sequence in working memory, bit by bit
until I understand the sub-goals of the story you are telling me or
anticipate its goal. More of this image tracking model below.
This sort of behavioral watching is part of socialization of
young primates, a wonderful preparation for adult social and
political life. No one would doubt that primates understand the
social behavior and its goals occurring throughout their troop,
e.g., Cheney and Seyfarth (2007). I suggest that this widespread
animal skill was essential in the ﬁrst great step to language, though
it needed no language nor anything not already available in these
primates.
STORYTELLING WITHOUT LANGUAGE
Modern language has many descriptions and incredible com-
plexity (Deacon, 1998). Yet in its beginnings it was simple and
concernedwith telling effective stories about people; it is this intro-
duction tonatural language and theprocess of its development that
is the basis of this study.
I believe that models of language evolution still lack agreement,
though support for the gesture origin is gradually increasing, per-
haps encouraged by improved understanding of mirror neurons
presented by Rizzolatti and Craighero (2004). The change is ana-
lyzed in detail by Corballis (2009). There remains no picture of
why the ﬁrst gestural steps might have attracted strong natural
selection. One alternative approach seems more useful.
I am an ethologist and geneticist, not a linguist. With the
support of linguist Thomas Sebeok, I presented a case for the
evolution, not of language, but of storytelling by mime (McBride,
1968, 2000). Storytelling required no new behaviors, all the skills
were available to hominins. It is a largely open system to handle any
story by/about people. I suggested that after a spectacularly suc-
cessful hunt, an alpha gave a play metasignal (Bateson, 1956) that
stopped the hominin band rushing to eat and gave full attention
to alpha. Alpha did not normally play. All the material of the hunt
was present, hunters, weapons, and prey. Previous smaller mimes
by females had given some preparation by their short gossipy play
stories.
Alpha mimed the hunt story; he directed his hunters to tasks in
their story, bringing them in. His watching troop had all observed
young males playing hunting. Perhaps the mime included some
abbreviating gestures like starting with; Go Stream, or Antelope
Baby. The mime was easy to understand; the prey was there, dead.
The feast would follow. The play metasignal merely changed the
attention of watchers from the prey to themime. The playmetasig-
nal communicates thatwhat followedwas“not real,”out of context,
recursive, but they had no difﬁculty recognizing the story. What
had been transmitted was something gestures alone could never
do, present a whole story, a metaphor for an event. Every watcher
understood how this hunt had been organized and why it was so
special.
Mimes are not language. The proposal is that mimes came
into being as a way of telling stories, long before any possibility of
language existed or was even anticipated. Mime was a complete
storytelling process well within the talents of the hominins in
whose bands it occurred. These individuals had zero concept of
language, but they could manage mimed stories and understand
them.Mimes and their understanding required nothing that every
hominin did not already have. The mime would have included
every call and gesture used in the story; it was never a silent per-
formance, nor was the hunt. Mimes took these hominins into
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stories of the past; the world of animals is mostly in the present.
Miming whole stories gave an immediate evolutionary advantage,
but ﬁrst, an evolutionary perspective.
PLAY AND LANGUAGE
The play metasignal has often been brought into language evolu-
tion studies. Thompson (2010) sawplay as both a learnednarrative
subject to natural selection, but also as a protostory. He sug-
gests storytelling makes personal episodic memories into group
episodic memories. “Without the story, it is clear we would not
be human” (p. 412). See also Coe et al. (2006). Episodic memories
are the basis of experience, (Schwartz and Evans, 2001).
ACQUIRING EXPERIENCE – STORYTELLING’S ROLE IN
EVOLUTION
Throughout animal evolution, natural selection found various
ways to ensure the production of reproductive adults. Some-
times enormous numbers of eggs and young were needed each
generation to rear a few experienced adults to produce the
next generation. Other youngsters evolved poisons that preda-
tors learned to avoid. Educating animals had always been costly
but natural selection could only produce generalized adapta-
tions, caution, excellent learning, memories, and sensory systems
with rapid responses to danger. Perhaps reﬂection on danger-
ous episodic memories could involve a metacognition extracting
speciﬁc lessons from thememorized experience, valuable for expe-
rienced adults; we know memorized experiences change, losing
accuracy, but retaining lessons.
Early animals foundmeeting conspeciﬁcs was inevitable; learn-
ing adjustments to themwas probably mainly by adopting spacing
that prevented interfering with each other, perhaps on territories
or sometimes associating closely when there were beneﬁts from
becoming gregarious. Youngsters joining adults would learn these
expected spacing arrangements, being corrected when they came
too close or crossed defended territorial borders, so that society
itself became an early teacher, transmitting learned societal skills
between generations.
In those species where family life evolved, two generations
came together for extended periods allowing complexity to emerge
within social relationships. These could now allow offspring to
learn from observing the food and experiences of parents, espe-
cially a wide range of living experiences of many adults when in
troops; this was a next step to the natural selection of adaptive
learned behavior, transmitted between generations, early steps to
culture.
Telling WHOLE stories gave every new generation access to
100s of living experiences second-hand from which to learn a
thousand dangers speciﬁc to their lives within their own particu-
lar environment, especially hunting experiences for boys. Natural
selection could never produce such diverse talents but it could
add high attention, story learning, and the ability to access,
and digest this experiential reservoir, becoming available when
danger threatened. Stories contained more experiences than any
youngster could expect to acquire personally in a lifetime. Telling
whole stories was a single huge jump that potentially allowed
youngsters to understand and prepare for experiences that could
occur in their own future, the culmination of millions of years
of natural selection to achieve experienced adults, cheaply, and
effectively. Thereafter, evolving language simply made telling
stories easier than full body miming. These youngsters grew
to maturity well socialized, understanding, and prepared for
everything that could happen to them in their lifetime. Natu-
ral selection had achieved this by creating a new evolutionary
system, based on selection of learned adaptations, culture. The
ﬁrst human culture was certainly an experiential culture based on
storytelling.
LANGUAGE OR CONVERSATION?
What was also essential to the evolution of complex language
from storytelling was the fact that telling stories required a double
interaction;
(1) a primary animal social interaction between you andme, here
and now and,
(2) a secondary interaction that contained the story.
It was this primary interaction engaging each other that pro-
vided the essential feedback, helping the teller to express the story
better by allowing the receiver to express anyneeds for better expla-
nations. Alpha had repeatedly looked at his audience to check
that they were understanding his story. Feedback was the part of
the communicative interaction we call non-verbal behavior, the
ancient animal interaction between you and me, here and now. It
was within these double interactions that language could slowly
evolve, bit by bit from storytelling. Language could never have
evolved its present complexity without the endless assistance that
watchers and listeners gave to each other every day in every con-
versation. Linguists may be impressed by the extreme power and
effectiveness of language, but it was never language that evolved;
it was the conversation, language’s evolutionary mechanism – it
still is!
Only the primary interaction could include the feedback essen-
tial to guide the slow improvement of ordinary language of
evolving people in their contexts, bit by bit by learning the thou-
sands of advances that became subject to learning and natural
selection. Natural selection of behavior is probably always by
“genetic assimilation,” Waddington’s (1953) term for Baldwin’s
(1896) natural selection for facility in ability to acquire/learn new
adaptive characters.
Language never evolved from an animal communicative sys-
tem. It never evolved from gestures. Whole stories alone had the
power of creating a vehicle that brought together the need for long
sequences of structured behavior leading to the understanding of
the goals of the behavior to be communicated. The evolution of
language lies in the conversion of whole stories from mimes to a
simpler system of signs and sounds which eventually completely
replaced mimes and acquired the complexity it now has. The
stories needed to transmit experiences to others, widening their
experiences. Only thus would natural selection become involved
and remain an important support during the long period while
language evolved. Of course once an early language became pos-
sible, questions, and the contribution of receivers could move
from non-verbal to language. Language in signing or sounds
soon increased the range of topics possible, gossip, and of course
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discussions on moving camp or dangers from territorial neigh-
bors. Planning hunts or foraging became possible. Language itself
became functional socially and also subject to natural selection.
That primary interaction always guided storyteller and recipi-
ents throughout the millennia that language evolved, very slowly.
The path certainly included ﬁrstly mime including all the calls
and gestures, then the transition to mainly gestures with some
iconic pantomimes and calls, and ﬁnally to speech, still with
lots of signs, and perhaps occasionally mimes. We still revert to
mimes; how could I show you how awkwardly he limped without
mime.
NATURAL SELECTION FOR STORYTELLING
Why should storytelling be subject to strong natural selection? I
suggest the following reasons.
• The ﬁrst was the experience children gained from playing real-
istic hunts they had never observed, learning new skills from
every story. Play became a real training for the day boys joined
the adult hunters. Trained hunters brought more food to the
troops, with fewer injuries.
• The second is the attention gained by skilled storytellers.
Attention gives status and status brings many beneﬁts. Good
storytelling earned attention and respect independently of rank.
Perhaps this was an early step from rank to status. Skilled
storytellers might also have been subject to sexual selection.
• The third and most important was that those in the troop
able to learn from the experiences of others now faced every
new situation with relevant experiences greater than they alone
could have acquired. To learn from others of a thousand speciﬁc
dangers and successful reactions within their own environment
increased their chances of escaping, to live to the next adventure.
Stories were the culmination of natural selection’s great search
to produce experienced adults without huge waste. Each sunset
heralded story time. Every remembered adventure and escape
could be shared. Over time, tribes accumulated large reper-
toires of stories, experiences, adding new ones, and recounting
old well-loved ones passed from generation to generation. A
treasure-trove was available to every wide-eyed child, cuddled
close to its parents through the darkening mysterious evenings,
soaking up every story. Have children changed? With language,
stories create forums as different experiences are exchanged.
Diamond (2014) has shown how such storytelling is ubiquitous
today in New Guinea tribesmen.
• The ﬁnal advantage lies in the ability of storytelling and teach-
ing to transmit learned information, culture. A chimpanzee
mother may “ﬁsh” for termites with a twig while the youngster
watches intently. But she is emitting, not directing communica-
tion to her offspring, as a miming animal would in a double
interaction. Teaching involves ﬁrst gaining the attention of
the other, then embedding a teaching interaction within the
interpersonal interaction, the double interaction. The teacher
demonstrates then follows each attempt of the pupil. Demon-
strating can sometimes be miming. Animals sometimes teach
but most learning is by observing. Hens in full display express
fear or aggression fully while calling urgently to their chicks
and bringing their attention to large spiders, teaching, a double
interaction (McBride et al., 1969).
Storytelling forums are ubiquitous. At lunch with friends
recently, one told of getting his car serviced at a large organi-
zation. The front tires had been ticked as checked but the friend
found at home, that they were badly worn on the insides, illegal!
Immediately a series of stories were told by others of experiences
dealing with such organizations, a forum of information exchange
emerged, all useful. Everyone has been in many such storytelling
exchanges. We gain so much of our understanding of our culture
from such forums, established for experience sharing by those
early communicators.
COMMUNICATING
Communication can be directed or emitted, deliberate or inciden-
tal, expected or unexpected. Scents deposited and birdsong (like
modern radio and TV) are deliberate, emitted, and expected. They
elicit no response. Every recipient selects the calls of its immediate
neighbors to monitor, hears them at dawn. The dawn birdsong
merely announces that society is as yesterday. If a call is miss-
ing, there is the unexpected information that a territory is vacant.
All neighbors “hear” that missing call. They respond in their own
interest. A non-territorial male becomes occupier of the vacant
territory, now smaller than that of his predecessor; established
neighbors have increased theirs. The society was restored by each
individual acting in its own interests.
You walk through busy streets noticing nothing; all is emit-
ted, incidental, anticipated, and expected information, Dennett’s
(1992) “unconscious driving experience.” A bison tracks emitted
incidental behavior of another settling for dust-bathing and joins
it, social facilitation.
Alpha’s watchers had changed from watching emitted and inci-
dental social and political stories daily to watching deliberate play
stories, directed at them. Most story behavior in every primate
troop or hominin band had always been emitted and inciden-
tal, observed by everyone. Storytelling brought these political and
information events into interactions, as stories, deliberately, and
directed. These were the stories of everyone else that eventually
became social and political gossip, restoring the ancient pastime of
all watchers, sharing everything happening in the troop. I suggest
this is a simpler account than that of Dunbar (2010), though com-
plementary. Grooming was retained but became limited, mostly
within pair families. Some became grooming of children, more
became cuddling or foreplay, privately in nests.
STORYTELLING’S ROLE IN CONSCIOUSNESS
With natural selection incorporating storytelling into genetic
constitutions, each step to language made great demands on indi-
viduals, particularly the need for immediate memory access to
every detail of the episodic experiences in memory. How could
alpha tell his story without controlled access to its memory and
extended attention far beyond the brief high attention of the Ori-
enting Response (OR). We have retained the OR, but also taken
its high attention, mental access, and attention to memories and
extended them, essentially indeﬁnitely.
We believe animals are mostly aware, living in an antici-
pated present and dealing with arriving sensory input, Dennett’s
“unconscious driving experience” that we have acquired from our
ancestors. We too can walk or drive from A to B remembering
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nothing of the trip. It may be through busy streets, but we are
aware, not conscious. The aware state is still busy, comparing all
sensory image input with the expected images in memory. If all
is as expected, the comparison remains only in working mem-
ory and is forgotten, clutter. Only an OR to detecting something
unexpected would bring the individual to attention, detecting an
image not present in the image maps and social models in mem-
ory. In the OR, a “consciousness” brings access and attention to
other relevant recalled memories to make decisions, to ﬂee, seek
more information or ignore, ancient responses, widespread in
animals.
Access to physical and social memories in the aware state and
the OR are central to expected anticipated animal and human
life. Each sensory image input appears to be the key that spec-
iﬁes which speciﬁc images should be recalled from memory for
comparison, an ongoing, and endless process in awareness; bet-
ter control of access to memories was probably seldom needed
outside the OR and possible meta-cognition in animals. Detect-
ing any change or recognition is impossible without comparison
of two images. Monitoring for absence of change provides the
stability of animal social and environmental living. They live in
expected, anticipated worlds, or within the “social norms” of
sociologists. The OR alerts to any change in physical and social
environment; it is a moment when the individual needs more
information and the ability to make decisions. Animals have been
making decisions for millions of years. The moments of OR are
probably the nearest animals come to consciousness, and probably
theORprovided that base equipment fromwhichnatural selection
shaped human consciousness (McBride, 2012). In ORs, improved
access to memories was important if previous experiences or story
experiences were to be used. Telling stories also needed far bet-
ter control over memory recall, unnecessary in normal animal
awareness. It needed extended consciousness, extending the OR
considerably.
Temporary memory is important in tracking the behavior of
others, bit by bit until each sentence goal of the behavior had been
understood, and again until the interaction sequence or story was
completed. Later we will consider an alternative that involves less
dependence on memory in this process. Yet any animal needed to
track behavior to understand the goals of behavior and interac-
tions all around them in troops, a basis of socialization. It became
more demanding for mimes out of context; presenting contexts
would always have been the difﬁcult part of mimes.
Searching in memories has always been a demand for ani-
mal minds. The environmental maps of familiar paths in
arboreal primates were three dimensional. Deciding to go to
drink from any part of the range or a sudden need to ﬂee
meant choosing a path, mentally moving a self-image freely
through alternative memory maps to decide on a plan. Is this
any different from you remembering the house you grew up
in and moving your attention through each room in your
memorized maps. Is it different from moving your attention
through the complications of language evolution? Is this think-
ing? Does it sometimes have a spatial origin? To move through
the multidimensional experience memory to choose a linear
path for a story again makes special demands on memory
access.
While the evolution of conscious thinking has many threads,
the demands of storytelling have certainly contributed. Every child
needed to remember each story, often moving through its images
repeatedly in extended consciousness to make sense and reality of
it; with elementary language, askingquestions about it. Conscious-
ness was emerging as ready access to those memories improved.
In this way, the stories could be turned into second-hand image
experiences inmemory, to beworked through repeatedly, available
when needed.
Understanding experiences, episodic memories remains a puz-
zle of great importance. Merely remembering some episode does
not create an experienced adult. Always many parts of the expe-
rience are irrelevant while some features need examination if
learning from experience is to be meaningful. We know that any
dramatic experience in people is likely to come to the fore inmem-
ory, often repeatedly. We know that we seek to locate the essential
features of the memory, and the feeling of satisfaction that follows
this understanding. The memory now becomes settled, less likely
to pop out again. The memory itself will have changed. We have
this skill in digesting episodic memories: do animals? Clearly it
evolved in us from something in animals and animals have always
faced these similar problems.
Perhaps some understanding of experiences might have
occurred by mind wandering (Corballis, 2014) into experiential
memories.We have suchmindwandering: do other species?Mem-
ories of experiences have always needed “digestion” to become
functional. What could minds do with such experiences except
move through the image sequences, perhaps repeatedly. In ORs,
some images would elicit recall of other relevant memories; this is
normal in ORs where they are matched, compared, and perhaps
differences discovered. We know that becoming an experienced
adult is important if beneﬁts are to accrue. Some “digestive”
process is required for learning from experiences to occur. Is
this only in us or have we inherited such an important process?
Where would it have been more important than in young-
sters digesting the many stories they were hearing? All involved
well extended conscious attention to experiences or story image
sequences.
Giving high and extended attention to the stories of individ-
uals could hardly have failed to elicit prosocial and empathic
feelings toward those telling exciting stories, Gaesser (2012).
Like any favorable mutual experience, sharing storytelling would
contribute to the feelings of solidarity within the troop.
Those moments of high attention and decision making in the
OR are obvious precursors from which natural selection could
build a human consciousness. ORs are extended in time in many
other situations. The OR is normally short, but in exploration
and hunts this high attention is extended presumably with access
to memories still relevant to the situation. An animal moving
to a new area explores, probably comparing what it sees by
searching for equivalent images in memory, particularly danger-
ous images. When this over, it has normally “chosen” places for
resting and sleep, for drinking and the paths between them. Deci-
sions were made – on experience? Learning is central to the OR,
also to exploration and hunting. Pavlov’s (1927) OR, was devel-
oped as important by another Russian scientist, Sokolov (1963)
who recognized that the OR was a signiﬁcant behavior; since
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then, 100s of studies have been made, mostly on people and
caged animals, but not by ethologists who see ORs daily in nat-
ural situations. The OR has not been related to exploration or
hunting.
SELF PRESENTATION
The self has always been central to animal evolution. Animals
were concerned with and learned only what was relevant to self,
stored in maps, and memories. Their environment is that part of
surroundings that is in memory, monitored, and eliciting an OR
should any difference occur between what is sensed and what is in
maps/models. Environment is not surroundings.
Self took a new role once storytelling emerged. Telling a story
of self included using the self as a “third person” in the mime or
signed story. Self could be presented, favorably? What self-image
was to be presented? Did this bolster the expansion of self-image
in early human minds? Perhaps achieving high status or winning
a higher rank had always demanded some self-presentation. Ani-
mals displaying on their territory had always presented self – with
some“consciousness”? Certainly our recentmove into anonymous
cities meant that strangers could only judge individuals by what
they could see; this new self-presentation has created enormous
industries. Every individual today grows expecting to present self,
urged by mothers to “look your best” when going outside among
strangers.
MIME LIMITATIONS
Mime could tell only some stories and ask no questions. It was
a clumsy way of storytelling. When language improved, ques-
tions bubbled out and a thousand types of stories emerged, of
battles, moving camps, important stories that could never be
mimed. Youngsters could be taught how to throw a spear or build
one. Teaching blossoms within double interactions as opposed to
learning by observation. Storytelling began as metaphors of real
events. More metaphors and similes were essential in bringing
complex objects, categories, places, contexts, and events info sto-
ries, expanding vocabularies. Every step to signing and language
reduced the limitations of miming, with less effort!
CULTURE
I have argued that elementary learned and selected “cultures”
evolved ﬁrst within and created primitive animal societies, were
later enhanced enormously within family life, especially in troops,
and exploded with storytelling. The ﬁrst signiﬁcant human
culture to emerge was an experiential culture, a highly func-
tional culture gained by storytelling, expanding with use of
language.
The double interaction brought teaching into any interaction,
demonstrating/miming. Every new demand for innovation in this
communicative system put pressures on the language part of the
transition. Asking questions must have fostered the transition to
language; questions also demanded further extension of the high
attention of the OR. I am only aware of the thousand steps from
mime to signs/sounds and thence to a modern spoken language;
only a linguist couldunravel them. I suggest that itwas this primary
interaction that was the source of endless feedback that pro-
vided the thousand steps that were subject to natural selection in
the gradual “Baldwinian genetic assimilation” of human language
skills.
Emotion is part of all storytelling and language, expressed con-
stantly in momentary movements of the face and body. There
could be no story without the expression of the feelings of the
players, signers, or speakers. Stories were mostly about people.
Expressing these feelings has obviously been selected naturally.
The modern human face has genetically assimilated the capac-
ity for complete expression of every momentary feeling evoked
by the story or the speaker. The use of the face to express these
feelings was part of effective human communicating; without
it there could be little of the mutuality and joint intentionality
emphasized by Tomasello (2010). Darwin (1872) brought emo-
tional expression to general attention and especially Ekman (1973)
showed how effectively the individual muscles of our faces have
evolved to express our feelings, moment by moment, providing
feedback.
MIMES TO LANGUAGE, THE EVOLUTIONARY TRANSITION
I have proposed that storytelling was the dramatic step toward
language that required nothing not available to the animal minds
of hominins. Lieberman (1988) proposed that grammar already
existed in behavior, emphasizing the hierarchical nature of behav-
ior, and language. Fodor (1975) saw representational systems with
symbols and their manipulation as central to thought, “a lan-
guage of thought.” But he thinks of thought as we do, as people.
Animals “think” in many OR situations; they presumably use
images; we know of no alternative. Perhaps some are equiva-
lent to Fodor’s symbols. Animal minds are ﬁlled with images;
it is hard to believe that behavior goals do not exist in images.
They have visual images of everything in life in their memo-
ries; their world is an image world. Animal thinking must rely
on these images in ORs. They are of scenes but also with cat-
egories, water, monkeys, trees and branches, rain, wind and
sunshine or cold, images they see or feel. Animals set goals for
any decision to make behavior, how else but by images, of what,
the behavior or its goal? The repertoire of gestures, calls or facial
expressions suggested as essential for cooperating hominin pair
families would have become the images for these goals. Perhaps
it was the image model of thinking that was also the behavior
planning language; if so they were together changed into human
languages.
Thinking in ORs includes deciding and planning the next
behavior. Decision making is ancient, long preceding any logi-
cal thinking processes, probably normally relying on feelings in
a situation, perhaps remembering images or feelings of similar
situations; these recalls and comparisons gave a conservative secu-
rity. Some decisions are delayed; more information is needed,
especially in social situations. Planning next behavior can be
demanding.
Lieberman (1988) drew attention to language and behavior
similarities, both organized hierarchically. However, I was intro-
duced to a different behavior planning and hierarchical structure
in an exciting lecture by Karl Pribram (Miller et al., 1960). Perhaps
there is a language of behavior implied by them, hierarchically
organized to deal with the incredible complexity of the behavior
planning and generating process. Yet the picture I have from years
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of worrying about their model is that there are two languages, one
that deals with behavior goals in planning in the mind and another
that deals with behavior generation, organized unconsciously by
the brain, a “planning language” and a “programming language.”
Let me enlarge.
Our primate decides to drink. Perhaps the plan is “get up and
go to place A. It is always dangerous there so look around. Then
on to place B where a long jump between trees is needed and
on to place C overlooking the stream. Then watch and if safe,
descend to water. Look around carefully. Drink, look around.
Get back into trees.” This is a series of major intermediate goal
images that may ﬂash through the mind, in a troop, all of the
minds. Clearly at each stage of the operation, the next sub-goal
will ﬂash into mind, but the journey continues; each new goal is
followed by the next plan, anticipated momentarily. The whole
plan comprises lots of ever smaller goals, each monitored as the
journey proceeds.
The behavior generating program for the goals is more com-
plex; a hierarchy of 100s of muscles must be pulled in perfect
timing to achieve every single movement in the program for
the ﬁrst goal to move self up and turn to the right direction.
Moving the body then demands that every limb, hand, ﬁn-
ger, foot, and toe muscle pulls must be organized to achieve
each tiny sub-goal, untold programmed muscle pulls, each
exquisitely timed, controlled, and monitored throughout to deal
with many more smaller goals, for jumping between and running
along branches to place A. All is familiar, with well-established
sub-programs.
I decide to make a cup of coffee, a plan of standing up, walk-
ing across the room, turning through the kitchen door, ﬁlling
the jug, and heating it, etc., so many intermediate goals. My
brain has the bigger job to program the muscles for throwing
my heavy head forward, then arranging muscles for my legs to
catch my body weight for standing up, then those legs need the
pulling of manymuscles, perfectly timed to walk, a familiar action.
I locate the jug and another programming takes over to orga-
nize the hands to ﬁt the jug and cup, well described by Frith
(2007). The unconscious program my brain produces involves
thousands of muscle pulls of controlled force, superbly timed, and
monitored; it is the incredible ﬂawless programmed and moni-
tored job that occurs in every activity, introduced to me by Karl
Pribram.
The planning language deals with a hierarchy of goals. It is the
simpliﬁed language of goals we use in discussing behavior. It is the
planning language we were forced to use throughout the evolution
of language. Yes, extracting a goal plan from the experiential mem-
ory of the hunt was central to generate the story mime. I suggest
that to move from the mime, our ancestors had to use the simpler
language of behavior goal planning. No story could be told if the
homininswere forced to tell the thousands of movements they saw,
though they had no alternative when miming the story! Goals are
central to the condensation of behavior stories. Plans of goals are
the same stories before they are programmed into detailed muscle
pulling behavior. They are the story created in minds, consciously
from memory. They were inevitably the second step to language
after the value of whole mimed stories had been established by
natural selection, the ﬁrst step.
Stories were the vehicle that created the demands for
simplifying as much behavior as possible to signs, calls or ges-
tures that could represent goals in any story. Any mimed story
could start with known signs for, “go stream” and end with, “come
back.”An action could be to mime the spearing of antelope infant
or to gesture, “spear baby.” The story always provided the vehicle
in which many of its small goals could be inserted into the mimes
as pantomimes or by any gestures known within the troop. And
every youngster beneﬁtted from easy understanding of the mixed
mime/gesture story.
These hominins had acquired gestures for 100s of commu-
nicative exchanges used daily in cooperating family units; the
mental representation of each gesture became the mental goals
for the behavior elicited by them. The behaviors of mimes already
depended on planning goals and images, some used to produce
that ﬁrst mime. Many, eventually all goals became gestures or
sounds. Simpliﬁcation converted mental goals into gestures or
calls. The simplifying step from whole mimes was to use any
goal images which already had gesture or call equivalents. If
these were understood throughout the troop, they could substitute
for sections of, or eventually the whole mime. And families had
already acquired very many short cuts in gestures and calls. When
any change was needed, these gesture/calls were what appeared
mentally as the action was performed. These represented ordi-
nary activities of people, available for substitution for goals of the
mime, simplifying it, yet still understood by everyone. Obviously
more were needed to create new goal gestures, probably iconic or
onomatopoeic for easy acceptance.
Language evolution constituted the transition from mime sto-
ries to the “language” of planning goals to tell the stories. It
was another use for the existing behavior planning process, but
now used quite differently as a complete communicative device.
Behavior planning goals remained subject to all the rules and orga-
nization that had always applied to behavior; it was itself just a
behavior generated as was every behavior but it made storytelling
very much easier. It also made the transition from mime to a
potential language straightforward and probably inevitable for a
species already familiar with communicating by a wide range of
gestures/calls.
I have emphasized the dual role of gestures and calls to counter
the assumption that the transition was completely to signs then
to speech. There had never been any need for silence while
communicating around the camp.
MECHANISMS
Animals and people have this generating process converting goals
into detailedmuscle behavior. Tracking behavior involves convert-
ing detailed observed behavior movements into goals, a reverse of
the generating process. Would natural selection create two differ-
ent complex mechanisms, or a way to use the same generating
process for the demands of the two directions of generating and
tracking? I suggest there is one mechanism. The double functions
of the mirror neurons strongly suggests their roles and perhaps
other similar components in both generation and tracking, though
how big a role remains to be discovered. The systemwould need to
involve learning rather than creating separate mirror neurons for
every movement, sign, and phoneme as these evolved complexity.
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We know we have a behavior generating process that turns
goals into functional behavior, including a mimed story. We know
we have a speech system that turns mental goals into verbal sto-
ries. We know that watching the mime can convert the behavior
into goals and understanding. We know that listening to the same
story, bit by bit yields the goals, and understanding of the story.
We know that there exist mirror neurons that could possibly be
used both to produce and follow a story. We are unsure of how
ubiquitous are these mirror neurons or whether they could handle
both learned words and signing movements, but we know that
words can serve both speech and listening, as can mirror neurons
and perhaps more general mirror equivalents, including learned
equivalents.
Thus tracking signed or word language, each goal sign or
sound is sensed, recognized along with its meaning and impli-
cations and transmitted to the generating mechanism to recover
the sequence of hierarchical goals until the story is recovered. The
generating language is the only mechanism we know is capable
of turning goals into behavior and behavior into goals, includ-
ing story understanding. We have taken the planning language and
made it our language, for generating and tracking behavior. It held
the possibility of all the subtlety of sub-planning and sub-sub-
planning. With experience, everyone could understand it as easily
as watching the mime. This was the language that was easy to
move to signs/calls; hominins were already using a planning func-
tion depending on common understanding throughout the troop.
They already had facility in recognizing the many signs/sounds
within their common contextual understanding. Using signs and
calls in the behavior planning language was not a large step in
interactions.
If there is a universal syntax, it involves both generating and
tracking in behavior and languages, in signing and words, for
example in generating ﬁghts and tracking every detail of the
opponent’s movements for goals needing responses. Certainly
the move to words, phonemes, and morphemes demanded the
same sort of intermediate goal recognition required for bit by
bit tracking as does signing and the watching of troop social
behavior. I have often wondered how I remember the many
words in a long sentence to arrive at or anticipate the sen-
tence goal. But I suggest that memory alone is not involved.
The reverse behavior generating mechanism is actively assem-
bling this goal understanding. Memory alone could never do
this.
With detailed programming language, one mistake in the syn-
tax of the planwould destroy thewhole behavior. Instead of getting
up tomake a cup of coffee, one could fall ﬂat on one’s face. Such an
efﬁcient behavior planning and programming skill/language must
have evolved early in animal evolution; one does not see animals
failing to reach goals or falling over.
The incredible effectiveness of behavior generating that allows
every animal to plan goals transmitted into activities involving
thousands of muscle pulls, all perfectly timed to achieve the goal
without ever amistake is suggestive of an inbuilt“universal syntax”
for behavior and language generation. If this existed, it would be
hard to deny that such a “universal syntax” suggested by Chomsky
(1957) became involved in our languages though he saw it as spe-
ciﬁc to language – he was a linguist. Natural selection is unlikely
to have evolved a second such similar powerful mechanism. It
wouldbe this same system that generates themovements ofmouth,
tongue and breathing in response to the ﬂow of word images being
called by mind and brain.
Is there an alternative model to a universal syntax? There are
equally ancient monitoring systems throughout all behavior and
language generating systems allowing rapid corrections in the gen-
erating processes. A learned monitoring program is possible that
stops the generation of muscle instruction sequences that have
not worked in the past, keeping to familiar, effective, practiced
or cultural sequences while carefully controlling and monitor-
ing new ones. Monitoring includes many functions, reaching
goals, feedback from others, from cultural expectations. In all
cases, there is monitoring of all behavior as it occurs. Tomasello
(2003) has suggested a “user based” developmental model of lan-
guage acquisition, an effective alternative, though I saw a systems
approach as an effective alternative to the acquisition process
in infants and children. Infants would, like us build on exist-
ing expectations, observing, and responding to each change they
observe around them, with age and previous steps always part
of the feedback processes. How would we choose between these
models?
Behavior or story plans are usually linear, one dimensional.
The activity generated is likely to emerge as multidimensional, as
in planning that drink. The plan is in the mind while the behav-
ioral generation for the program is unconscious in the brain and
is not linear. It was this double behavior planning and program-
ming that produced that ﬁrst mime. It was certainly adaptable
enough to transfer from memory a goal plan in “planning lan-
guage” to include every critical goal and every call and sign used
within the story. The hunt had beenmany dimensional withmany
smaller sequences, but the hunters each chose a single dimensional
story plan to be shaped into the muscle details of his mime. Their
behavioral planning skills gave them freedom to choose what to
mime and what to ignore. All the mind required was the ability to
use memory to plan goal elements of the hunt, probably a simple
linear story, a goal story. Memory would have aided the genera-
tion of a realistic acting storytelling, ignoring the images of the
context.
This questions the format of episodic memories. How much is
in behavior planning language and howmuch in full imagememo-
ries of the behavior observed. Clearly the episodic scenes observed
were memorized as full images. Yet when episodic memories are
examined for understanding, this requires their transition to goal
planning language, probably an efﬁcient change. Transitions to a
goal language may assist analysis if this occurs. Full images are
clearly stored as memories, but any mental examination uses the
simple language of goals.
When miming, signing or speaking a story from memory, the
mind chooses only one story plan, but it is the detailed programs
for the brain that must now differ. This step to brain programs
now depends only on learned mechanics to send to the behav-
ior programming algorithm. Whole body plans for mimes used
the ancient skills; signing demanded learned skills of program-
ming arm, hand, facial, and vocal muscles to produce a quite
different signed behavioral version of the same story. Modern
speech involves many muscles performing quite different learned
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sound producing actions from telling a story by mime or signs.
Yet the same story goal image sequence in memory and choice
of a story plan is not changed but chooses images of words
representing sequential goals, and a learned program for the
thousands of individual facial, mouth, and breathing muscles is
elicited, andmonitored. Themovements of speechmay be learned,
but the ability to create this range of sounds was genetically
assimilated.
The transition of planning goals to signs and words was cer-
tainly a big learning and genetic assimilationprocess. Theplanning
process needed to change as signs were learned to replace image
goals and sub-goals, creating ﬁrstly sign programs without alter-
ing the plan. A complete change of the muscles now had to be
learned to present the story in signing and speaking. Once learned,
(and the ability to make the conversion presumably genetically
assimilated) the same behavior planning process was appropri-
ate, but quite different sets of movement instructions were needed
to generate the same story. We still learn these different skills;
thousands annually learn facility in signing and speaking different
languages.
I suggest that storytelling in mime, signing, and speech and
also episodicmemories involve the same language of behavior goal
planning, with human language now becoming a more efﬁcient
thought process in goal-words than images. It is probably the same
language of thought in images of Fodor, now with words, and for
the deaf, signs replacing goal images. We needed access to differ-
ent learned sets of muscle movements for signing and speaking.
And each of us can learn any of these, signing and talking any
language.
Was it likely that a completely new mechanism would have
evolved to produce each step to speech? Natural selection modi-
ﬁes (exapts) existing characters where possible, and very efﬁcient
behavioral mechanisms already existed. In both behavioral and
speech planning, any syntax seems likely to have origins in the
languages of behavior planning/generation. Inmiming, signing or
speech, it is a language of goal planning that is converted into the
learned muscles generating each format.
There are alwaysmany possibleways of generating any behavior
or telling any story. Themindmay choose one or let the brainmake
the choice as well as create the plan that will also involve a choice
of speciﬁc action components. This would be as true of language
as any other behavior.
Stories are multidimensional with many things happening
simultaneously yet the story, planned, signed or spoken is gen-
erated linearly. No two people would tell the same story of any
experience. Minds evolved to plan and select linear goal stories of
any event from memory as they chose linear plans for any behav-
ior. Complex episodes needed to be coded only in behavior
planning language. Consider how we think linearly of making
that cup of coffee, quite different from the plan the brain must
produce to push every detail of a body image through familiar
surroundings. With these evolved incredible skills of hierarchi-
cal behavior generating to make a cup of coffee, we can plan the
many dimensional construction of a skyscraper or an Olympic
games!
Summarizing, the detailed movement image of the story has
become irrelevant in the transmission of stories. The simpliﬁed
word or signed image of each goal of the story satisﬁes the
needs of the communication. It is understood in enough detail,
with extra available by questions when needed, without the
need for a full imaged movement picture of the story enter-
ing memory. Our skills in reading are another learned process.
Clearly this more efﬁcient processing of information was part of
a recent cultural evolutionary process. We retain the ability to
track behavior as in movies and the incidental stories we still see
daily.
WHEN?
Questions have been raised about how recent was the evolution
of human language. There are two parts to the question. One is
the time needed for storytelling to be converted to speech with the
whole ﬁnal process genetically assimilated throughout the species.
This occurred in small semi-isolated hunting-gathering bands
with regular exchange of individuals with each advance occur-
ring probably in a different band, spreading between neighboring
to distant bands.
Wright (1931), the greatAmerican geneticist, presented the case
for ideal conditions for rapid natural selection – a large popula-
tion divided into small semi-isolated subgroups; he could have
been describing the hominin population throughout most of its
evolution. The natural language evolution from storytelling plan-
ning to speech ﬁts his model, using both within and between band
genetic variance. With such a spatial subdivision the evolution
would not have been rapid.
The second is the time needed to spread modern speech
throughout the whole human population, omitting no one. On
this, we know that our species acquired genes from both Nean-
derthals and Denisovans. Thus the single spread of one source of
ancestors “out of Africa” is no longer enough to account for the
spread of language from a single source unless these species all
had language. Upsetting an evolving language genotype by cross-
ing with a non-linguistic species would not have been a minor
genetic event, but one quickly eliminated by natural selection
unless there were some other functional advantages to be retained
from the cross. Even then, the spread of functional geneticmaterial
and selection against the harmful effects on genetic assimilation
of communication handicaps would have been complex and in
competition with the genotypes of bands free of outcrossing.
Selection within and between bands would be difﬁcult to esti-
mate. I suggest that language evolution was probably complete
before the separation of the African from the Neanderthal and
other later contributors to our modern genome. The spread of
genes from these crosses continues without effect on language.
Did it always?
The effectiveness of selection depends on various factors, the
characters, and their number, their heritabilities and correlations,
the intensity of selection of each character in each band, the band
size, and the amount of exchange between bands. We assume
that hominins lived in small bands with some contacts between
bands and that these bands split when they grew large. Without
splitting, there could be no accounting for the millions of bands
that spread throughout the world at least twice. Like chimps, it
would probably have been the females that moved between bands,
with the males responsible for maintenance of territory. Language
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evolution was probably complete in both Neanderthals and Homo
sapiens when they crossbred while the latter reconquered the
earth.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
To my wife Helen whose devotion to clear English was essential.
To Michael Corballis for many discussions and comments; to Bill
von Hippel for reading, comment, and encouragement; to Paul
Bloom for encouragement.
REFERENCES
Baldwin, J. M. (1896). A new factor in evolution. Am. Nat. 30, 441–451. doi:
10.1086/276408
Bateson, G. (1956). “The message ‘This is play’,” in Group Processes: Transactions
of the Second Conference, ed. B. Schaffner (New York: Josiah Macy Foundation),
145–242.
Bekkering, H., Wohlschlager, A., and Gattis, M. (2000). Imitation of ges-
tures in children is goal-directed. Q. J. Exp. Psychol. A 53, 153–164. doi:
10.1080/713755872
Cheney, D. L., and Seyfarth, R. M. (2007). Baboon Metaphysics: The
Evolution of a Social Mind. Chicago: Chicago University Press. doi:
10.7208/chicago/9780226102429.001.0001
Chomsky, N. (1957). Syntactic Structures. The Hague: Mouton & Co.
Coe, K., Aitken, N. E., and Palmer, C. (2006). Once upon a time: ancestors
and the evolutionary signiﬁcance of stories. Anthropol. Forum 16, 21–40. doi:
10.1080/00664670600572421
Corballis, M. C. (2003). From Hand to Mouth: The Origins of Language. Princeton:
Princeton University Press.
Corballis, M. C. (2009). The evolution of language. Ann. N. Y. Acad. Sci. 1156,
19–43. doi: 10.1111/j.1749-6632.2009.04423.x
Corballis, M. C. (2014). Wandering tales: evolutionary origins of mental time travel
and language. Front. Psychol. 4:485. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00485
Darwin, C. (1872). The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals. London:
John Murray.
Deacon, T.W. (1998). Symbolic Species: The Co-Evolution of Language andThe Brain.
New York: W. W. Norton & Co.
Dennett, D. C. (1992). Consciousness Explained. Boston, MA: Back Bay Books.
Diamond, J. (1991). The Rise and Fall of the Third Chimpanzee. London: Vintage.
Diamond, J. (2014).TheWorld Until Yesterday:WhatWeCan Learn FromTraditional
Societies. London: Penguin Group, Kindle edition.
Dunbar, R. (2010). Grooming, Gossip and the Evolution of Language. London: Faber
and Faber, Kindle Edition.
Ekman, P. (ed.). (1973). Darwin and Facial Expression. New York: Academic Press.
Fodor, J. A. (1975). The Language of Thought. New York: Thomas Crowell.
Frith, C. D. (2007). Making Up the Mind: How the Brain Creates Our Mental World.
London: Blackwell Publishing, Kindle edition.
Frith, C. D., and Frith, U. (2012). Mechanisms of social cognition. Annu. Rev.
Psychol. 63, 287–313. doi: 10.1146/annurev-psych-120710-100449
Gaesser, B. (2012). Constructing memory, imagination and empathy: a cogni-
tive neuroscience perspective. Front. Psychol. 3:576. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2012.
00576
Gore, R. (2003). The rise of mammals. Natl. Geog. 2–37.
Hediger, H. (1962). “The evolution of territorial behaviour,” in The Social Life of
Early Man, ed. S. L. Washburn (London: Methuen), 17–33.
Hickok, G. (2013). Do mirror neurons subserve action understanding? Neurosci.
Lett. 540, 56–58. doi: 10.1016/j.neulet.2012.11.001
Hrdy, S. B. (2009). Mothers and Others: The Evolutionary Origins of Mutual
Understanding. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 422.
Lieberman, P. (1988). On the evolution of human syntactic ability: its pre-adaptive
base – motor control and speech. Hum. Evol. 3, 3–18. doi: 10.1007/BF02436588
McBride, G. (1968). On the evolution of human language. Soc. Sci. Inform. 7, 81–85.
doi: 10.1177/053901846800700507
McBride, G. (2000). The Genesis Chronicles: The Evolution of Humankind. Sydney:
Allen & Unwin.
McBride, G. (2012). Ethology, evolution, mind and consciousness. J. Conscious.
Explor. Res. 3, 830–840.
McBride, G., Parer, I. P., and Foenander, F. (1969). The social organisation and
behaviour of the feral domestic fowl. Anim. Behav. Monogr. 2, 127–181. doi:
10.1016/S0066-1856(69)80003-8
Miller, G. A., Galanter, E., and Pribram, K. H. (1960). Plans and the Structure of
Behaviour. New York: Rinehart & Winston.
Pavlov, I. P. (1927). Conditioned Reﬂexes. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Pinker, S., and Bloom, P. (1990). Natural language and natural selection. Behav.
Brain Sci. 13, 707–784. doi: 10.1017/S0140525X00081061
Rizzolatti, G., and Craighero, L. (2004). The mirror-neuron system. Annu. Rev.
Neurosci. 27, 169–192. doi: 10.1146/annurev.neuro.27.070203.144230
Rizzolatti, G., Fadiga, L., Gallese,V., and Fogassi, L. (1996). Premotor cortex and the
recognition of motor actions. Cogn. Brain Res. 3, 131–141. doi: 10.1016/0926-
6410(95)00038-0
Schwartz, B. L., and Evans, S. (2001). Review: episodic memory in primates. Am. J.
Primatol. 55, 71–85. doi: 10.1002/ajp.1041
Sokolov, E. N. (1963). Higher nervous functions: the orienting response. Annu. Rev.
Physiol. 25, 505–550. doi: 10.1146/annurev.ph.25.030163.002553
Thompson, T. A. K. (2010). The ape that captured time: folklore, narrative and the
human-animal divide. West. Folk. 69, 395–420.
Tomasello, M. (2003). Constructing a Language: A Usage Based Theory of Language
Acquisition. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Tomasello,M. (2010).TheOrigins of HumanCommunication. Cambridge,MA:MIT
Press, Kindle edition.
Tomasello, M. (2014). Natural History of Human Thinking. Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, Kindle edition.
Waddington, C. H. (1953). The “Baldwin Effect,” genetic assimilation and
“homeostasis.” Evolution 7, 386–387. doi: 10.2307/2405346
Wheeler, P. E. (1988). Stand tall to stay cool. New Sci. 118, 62–65.
Wheeler, P. E. (1991). The inﬂuence of bipedalism on the energy and water bud-
gets of early hominids. J. Hum. Evol. 21, 107–136. doi: 10.1016/0047-2484(91)9
0002-D
White, T. D., Asfaw, B., Bevene, Y., Haile-Selassie, Y., Lovejoy, C. O., Suwa, G., et al.
(2009).Ardipithecus ramidus and the paleobiology of early hominids. Science 326,
75–86. doi: 10.1126/science.1175802
Wright, S. (1931). Evolution in mendelian populations. Genetics 16, 97–159.
Conflict of Interest Statement:The author declares that the researchwas conducted
in the absence of any commercial or ﬁnancial relationships that could be construed
as a potential conﬂict of interest.
Received: 20 June 2014; accepted: 17 September 2014; published online: 15 October
2014.
Citation: McBride G (2014) Storytelling, behavior planning, and language evolution
in context. Front. Psychol. 5:1131. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2014.01131
This article was submitted to Evolutionary Psychology and Neuroscience, a section of
the journal Frontiers in Psychology.
Copyright © 2014 McBride. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms
of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use, distribution or repro-
duction in other forums is permitted, provided the original author(s) or licensor are
credited and that the original publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with
accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which
does not comply with these terms.
www.frontiersin.org October 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 1131 | 11
